Supreme Court’s Ruling on Governor’s Assent to Bills
Context: Recently, In a landmark judgment delivered, the Supreme Court of India ruled that the Tamil Nadu Governor’s act of withholding assent to 10 state bills and reserving them for Presidential consideration was “illegal” and “arbitrary.”
Constitutional Framework: Role of the Governor under Article 200
Article 200 of the Indian Constitution outlines four options for a Governor when presented with a bill passed by the state legislature:
- Grant assent;
- Withhold assent;
- Return the bill (if not a money bill) for reconsideration;
- Reserve the bill for the consideration of the President.
The provision to Article 200 further stipulates that once a bill is returned, and passed again by the legislature, the Governor “shall not withhold assent.”
However, the absence of a specific timeline for these actions has often enabled Governors to indefinitely delay decisions — a situation likened to a “pocket veto,” creating a constitutional vacuum and obstructing legislative processes.
The Tamil Nadu Case: A Constitutional Crisis
- Between January 2020 and April 2023, the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly passed 12 bills — many relating to higher education reforms — which were delayed or denied assent by Governor R.N. Ravi.
- These included politically significant legislation such as the Tamil Nadu NEET Exemption Bill.
- After the Assembly re-enacted 10 of these bills in a special session, the Governor controversially referred them all to the President, triggering a constitutional confrontation.
- The state contended that this constituted an abuse of discretionary power and a denial of the democratic mandate.
Key Takeaways from the Supreme Court Ruling
- Timelines for Gubernatorial Action:
- When acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers: Assent must be granted or reservation made within 1 month.
- When acting contrary to ministerial advice: Reservation for the President must happen within 3 months.
- For re-enacted bills: Assent must be given within 1 month.
- Invalidation of Arbitrary Presidential Reference: The court ruled that a Governor cannot reserve a bill for Presidential assent after it is re-passed by the legislature, unless the bill is materially different. This reaffirms the supremacy of the elected legislature in a parliamentary democracy.
- Article 142 Invoked: The court exercised its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to deem the 10 bills as having received assent, overriding the prolonged gubernatorial inaction and upholding the rule of law.
- Rejection of “Pocket Veto” and “Absolute Veto”: The judgment categorically stated that the Constitution does not permit a Governor to indefinitely delay or override the legislature’s will.
Impact on Federalism and Centre-State Relations
- Strengthening Legislative Autonomy: The ruling reaffirms that Governors are bound by the aid and advice of the State Cabinet in most matters, aligning with democratic principles.
- Curtailing Central Overreach: In recent years, Governors in opposition-ruled states such as Kerala, Telangana, Punjab, and West Bengal have been accused of stalling state legislation, creating tensions in India’s cooperative federalism.
- Setting Judicial Precedent: This ruling will significantly influence ongoing cases such as Kerala’s petition against the delay of six bills and Telangana’s dispute involving over 10 pending bills.
Critical Analysis and Way Forward
- Constitutional Morality and Institutional Respect: As Justice Pardiwala noted, the Governor’s role is not to “thwart the will of the people” but to facilitate governance in line with constitutional values.
- Need for Codified Timelines: The ruling compensates for the absence of statutory timelines in Article 200. However, codifying these timelines through legislation may help prevent future conflicts.
- Reforming Gubernatorial Appointments: The politicisation of the Governor’s office — often seen as an instrument of central influence — calls for a revisit of the appointment process, ensuring political neutrality and constitutional propriety.
