Pakistan’s Power or Dependence?

Explore whether Pakistan’s global re-engagement represents true power or disguised dependency. This analysis contrasts Muqtedar Khan’s view of revival with Manoj K. Channan’s critique of Pakistan’s economic weakness, political instability, and foreign dependence.

Introduction

In recent months, Pakistan has re-entered debate in international affairs. Political scientist Muqtedar Khan argues that the country is experiencing a diplomatic revival, gaining renewed recognition and influence on the world stage (“Pakistan’s Revival should Worry India”, The Indian Express, 31 October 2025). In contrast, Manoj K. Channan contends that this visibility is an illusion — masking deeper economic and political weakness (“Its Sovereignty is Rented”, The Indian Express, 31 October 2025). Khan views Pakistan’s actions as signs of rising status, while Channan interprets them as evidence of growing dependency. This essay presents both sides of the argument, analyses the evidence, and concludes that Pakistan’s so-called revival is better understood as dependency disguised as diplomacy.

Revival

Muqtedar Khan paints an optimistic picture of Pakistan’s global standing. He claims that following Operation Sindoor — a military conflict between India and Pakistan — Islamabad has regained international respect. Western countries, Gulf monarchies, and Asian powers are once again treating Pakistan as a partner rather than a problem.

He highlights several examples of this apparent revival. The United States has re-engaged with Pakistan, with President Donald Trump hosting its leaders and involving the country in the Gaza peace process. China continues to shield Pakistan diplomatically, while Russia has sold advanced fighter-jet engines to Islamabad — a gesture of growing trust. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have reopened aid and visa programmes, signalling goodwill from the Gulf.

Overall, Pakistan is presented as having moved from isolation to inclusion, enjoying cordial ties with major powers — the US, China, and Russia — and even securing a seat on the UN Security Council. He further suggests that India’s attempt to label Pakistan a sponsor of terrorism has failed, as global opinion has become more balanced. What was meant to isolate Pakistan, Khan concludes, has instead “turned into its rehabilitation.”

Dependency

In contrast, Manoj K. Channan calls Pakistan’s newfound visibility “survival theatre” rather than a true comeback. The argument centres on the claim that this apparent revival conceals an erosion of sovereignty and increasing external control over politics, the economy, and national security. None of Pakistan’s major partners — the United States, China, or Saudi Arabia — are portrayed as trusting allies; they engage with Pakistan only to advance their own interests.

The United States seeks Pakistan as a convenient flank in Afghanistan, a low-cost option in Iran, and a counter-weight within China’s sphere of influence — relationships that will fade once these tactical needs change. The Saudi defence pact is depicted not as a gesture of fraternity but as a form of outsourced labour, with Riyadh relying on Pakistani troops because they are inexpensive and expendable, not because Pakistan is an equal or reliable partner. Similarly, China, once regarded as an “iron brother,” now acts as a creditor holding Pakistan’s “mortgage.”

Through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Beijing is said to control ports, minerals, and economic zones that were once national assets — “investing in Pakistan’s compliance, not its sovereignty.” Pakistan’s economy is described as surviving on bailouts and deposits rather than production, with foreign policy becoming “indistinguishable from debt negotiation.” IMF and World Bank loans impose strict conditions that limit national independence.

Overall, the argument concludes that Pakistan’s current diplomacy represents rented relevance — a façade of visibility without genuine power.

Economic Realities

To understand which argument is more convincing, it is necessary to examine the economic facts. Pakistan’s economy remains heavily dependent on external financing. The IMF, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and Chinese lenders together shape much of Pakistan’s financial policy. These bailouts may keep the country afloat but advance structural dependency that undermines sovereign governance.

Such dependency has direct consequences. When international creditors demand austerity measures — cutting subsidies, raising taxes, or privatising industries — Pakistan must comply, even if those policies hurt ordinary citizens. This loss of choice weakens democracy and self-determination.

Furthermore, many of Pakistan’s most valuable assets — from Gwadar Port to mineral rights in Balochistan — have become linked to Chinese administration under CPEC. When key infrastructure is controlled by another state, sovereignty turns symbolic.

In this context, Khan’s claim of a “revival” appears incomplete. A country cannot claim genuine power abroad if it lacks economic control at home.

Diplomatic Re-engagement

However, it is true, as Khan notes, that Pakistan has regained diplomatic attention. After years of isolation, global powers now meet its leaders and offer limited cooperation. This attention is largely pragmatic and tactical, not a heartfelt endorsement. For example, the United States sees Pakistan as a temporary tool in regional conflicts, not as a long-term ally. Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE view Pakistan as a provider of manpower, not an equal partner in shaping regional policy. China still treats Pakistan as a strategic corridor but one that must remain obedient to Beijing’s interests. Therefore, while diplomatic activity has increased, the quality of engagement remains shallow. Pakistan is being included in conversations, but not in decisions.

Domestic Challenges

Both writers acknowledge that Pakistan’s internal problems could undermine its external image. Channan points to political instability and the imprisonment of former Prime Minister Imran Khan as signs of institutional paralysis. These issues reduce international confidence and reinforce Pakistan’s dependence on the military for governance.

Muqtedar Khan, too, admits that Pakistan must “stabilise its economy and manage domestic unrest” if it wishes to sustain its gains. In other words, even he recognises that the diplomatic revival is fragile and could easily collapse if internal crises deepen.

The persistent tension between the civilian government and the army, along with insurgencies in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, means Pakistan’s state institutions often focus on survival rather than long-term reform.

Thus, whether one views Pakistan as reviving or declining, both sides agree that domestic instability remains its greatest threat.

India’s Position

Both Khan and Channan frame their arguments with reference to India. Khan worries that Pakistan’s resurgence will reduce India’s dominance in South Asia, while Channan argues that the contrast with India exposes Pakistan’s weakness.

Channan’s comparison is striking: India’s economy is ten times larger than Pakistan’s, allowing New Delhi to negotiate partnerships from a position of strength. While India joins economic coalitions and technology blocs, Pakistan struggles with relief negotiations and debt extensions.

Meanwhile, India still maintains diversified partnerships and can influence long-term regional outcomes. Even if Pakistan’s diplomatic visibility rises temporarily, India’s economic power ensures strategic endurance.

Therefore, while Pakistan may win short-term attention, India retains long-term advantage.

Power vs. Perception

The key difference between the two arguments lies in how each defines power.

• Khan equates power with visibility and recognition — being invited to summits, signing defence pacts, and receiving praise from world leaders.
• Channan defines power as autonomy and influence — the ability to make independent choices and shape global outcomes.

When measured by autonomy, Pakistan falls short. Its economy is steered by external creditors, its defence policy relies on other states, and its politics are shaped by internal military dominance. In Channan’s words, “Governance has been replaced by diplomatic fundraising.”

However, Khan is not entirely wrong. Diplomatic rehabilitation, even if temporary, offers Pakistan opportunities to rebuild trust and gain leverage. The challenge lies in converting attention into agency — turning visibility into genuine independence.

At present, Pakistan’s diplomacy looks less like revival and more like managed participation in global affairs.

Conclusion

Pakistan stands at a crossroads, facing a choice between continued dependence on foreign aid or undertaking bold reforms to regain control over its economy and politics. Sustainable sovereignty demands economic diversification, transparency, and stronger domestic capacity. Without these, the nation risks remaining a client state, bound by loans and shifting global interests.

While Muqtedar Khan celebrates Pakistan’s renewed visibility, Manoj K. Channan presents a more realistic view — that this is not revival but repackaged dependency, a diplomacy of survival rather than strength. The warmth from Washington, Riyadh, and Beijing reflects strategic management, not genuine trust.

To turn visibility into real power, Pakistan must rebuild from within — fostering self-reliance, strengthening democracy, and freeing itself from external creditors. Only through such transformation can it move beyond the appearance of sovereignty to achieve its true substance.

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The Source’s Authority and Ownership of the Article is Claimed By THE STUDY IAS BY MANIKANT SINGH